The apoha theory contains a number of occasionally technical and even counterintuitive elements, and the main purpose of this chapter is to present its most fundamental features in a straightforward fashion. At the outset it is critical to note that, while certainly unified in its overall scope, the apoha theory underwent historical development that led to divergent interpretations among its formulators, and any single, unified account of the theory would be problematic. Hence, this chapter will focus on a pivotal historical moment in the theory’s development, namely, its articulation by the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti (fl. 625), especially as interpreted by his immediate commentators, Devendrabuddhi (fl. 675) and Śākyabuddhi (fl. 700). To contextualize this particular layer of interpretation, I will begin with a brief historical overview and then present some contextual material under two headings: Dharmakīrti’s causal model of cognition along with the minimalism about concepts that such a model encourages and the basics of his ontology. With these matters in place, I will then examine the fundamental points of Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The apoha theory finds its first explicit articulation in the work of Dignāga (fl. 425), the first Buddhist philosopher to employ rigorously the style of discourse that we may call pramāṇavāda, or “pramāṇa theory.” This style of discourse, which appears to arise primarily from the early efforts of the
Nyāya school, focuses on what constitutes a pramāṇa, that is, the reliable means or (literally) the “instrument” for arriving at a trustworthy or reliable cognition (pramitī). Verbal testimony and various forms of inference are considered important forms of pramāṇa, and these are understood to operate through the use of conceptuality (vikalpa). Thus, a major topic of discussion within pramāṇa theory is the issue of conceptual cognition (savikalpajñāna), and since conceptual cognition is thought to necessarily take a universal (variously called sāmānya, jāti, ākṛti, etc.) as its object, a discussion of conceptuality requires a theory of universals. Dignāga’s apoha theory is an attempt to formulate a theory of universals—and, hence, a theory of conceptual cognition—that takes a nominalistic approach which rejects the realism about universals found in other, non-Buddhist philosophical traditions of classical South Asia.

Dignāga’s formulation of the apoha theory was explicitly criticized by the Nyāya philosopher Uddyotakara (fl. 525) and by the Buddhist thinker Bhāvaviveka (fl. 530), who developed a similar theory of his own. Dignāga’s thought—including the apoha theory—receives a significant reworking at the hands of Dharmakīrti, and it is his reformulation that forms the basis for all subsequent treatments, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist. Among Buddhist thinkers, the earliest commentarial layer consists of works by Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, and while they propose some innovations, their interpretations do not range far from Dharmakīrti’s works. Thinkers such as Śāntarakṣita (d. 787) and Kamalaśīla (fl. 765) incorporate Dharmakīrti’s philosophy into their Mādhyamika perspective, but the details of his pramāṇa theories are not significantly revised. However, by the time of later commentators such as Jñānaśrīmitra (fl. 1000), Ratnakīrti (fl. 1025), Karnakagomin (fl. 975), and Mokṣākaragupta (fl. 1100), a general trend toward ever-greater realism about universals becomes evident. In Tibet, realist interpretations gain momentum, and in some cases receive criticism, at the hands of numerous prominent thinkers, some of whom are considered in this volume. Since the presentation given in this chapter focuses on the earliest layer of interpretation, it may appear to conflict with the more realist approaches of some later Buddhist authors, but the general contours and mechanics of the theory will nevertheless remain the same.

COGNITIVE MODEL AND MINIMALISM ABOUT CONCEPTS

Dharmakīrti articulates the apoha theory within his commitment to a causal and descriptive model of embodied cognition and the minimalist approach that this commitment brings to concepts. As a way to frame this
aspect of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, we might compare it to the contemporary notions of “naturalized” epistemology. Broadly, the term “naturalized” refers to the project of integrating phenomenological or epistemological theories into an explanatory framework that is in some fashion tightly bound with the natural sciences. Clearly, Dharmakīrti’s approach cannot share a concern with the natural sciences of today, but it does share the impetus toward “an empirical psychological study of our cognitive processes,” which is part of what it means for epistemology to be “naturalized” in our contemporary context. More specifically, Dharmakīrti’s work can be treated as an extension of the Abhidharma tradition upon which it is based, and it thus assumes a detailed account of matters including the various components of attention and metacognition, the workings of memory, the types and characteristics of emotional states, the physiological composition of the sense faculties, and so on. While the Abhidharma may diverge from our contemporary scientific understanding of such issues, it similarly presents itself as engaged in a careful and allegedly empirical description of human psychology, including cognitive and affective processes. It is crucial to recognize that Dharmakīrti participates in this larger Buddhist project, and that his work is an extension of it.

One expression of this feature of Dharmakīrti’s work is that his epistemology, which encompasses his theory of concepts, is “event based” in that it aims to describe the way that particular mental events (jñāna) can be reliable in regard to successful human action. These events, moreover, arise in accordance with a causal model of cognition that includes physiological and psychological elements. The model presumes that any causally efficacious thing endures for only an instant; thus, the model involves the causal interaction of momentary entities. To the extent that any causally efficient entities appear to endure over time, they are actually a series of momentary entities that are causally related to each other in such a way that one moment in the sequence acts as the primary cause for the next moment in the sequence. Thus, if one is observing a patch of blue, the matter that constitutes that patch actually endures for only an instant; nevertheless, the patch appears to endure longer because the matter constituting the patch occurs in a sequence of moments of that matter, each instance of which arises from the previous moment of matter and perishes as it produces the next moment. Such is also the case with the matter that constitutes the body, including the sense faculties, and with consciousness itself, with the proviso that in the case of consciousness, the moments that constitute the flow of consciousness are mental—not material—in nature.

On this model, a cognitive event is a moment of consciousness under particular causal conditions, and for the purposes of understanding the
theory of concepts involving apoha, perhaps the best example of such an event is the act of recognition (\textit{pratyabhijñāna}) that occurs when a perceived object—for example, a patch of blue color—is conceptually labeled or recognized—that is, as “blue.” Such an event presumes three causal streams: (1) the causal stream of the matter constituting the perceived object; (2) the causal stream of matter constituting the sense faculty; and (3) the immaterial causal stream constituting the mind. Each of these streams is reducible to discrete, causally efficient moments that endure only an instant. When the object comes into relation with the sense faculty, if other conditions are in place, it causes the mind to arise with a phenomenal form of the object in a subsequent moment. This phenomenal form is not a mere mirror of the object because its phenomenal appearance is conditioned by factors other than the object, including the state of the sense faculty and the various cognitive and affective features of the previous moment of mind. However, in epistemically reliable contexts, the phenomenal form does bear a “resemblance” (\textit{sārūpya}) to the moment of the object that created it inasmuch as the relevant causal characteristics of the phenomenal form are restricted by the causal characteristics of the object. The phenomenal form that first arises through sensory contact is “nonconceptual” (\textit{nirvikalpaka}) in that it has not undergone the apoha process, but under the right conditions, the apoha process occurs in yet another subsequent moment, and this moment of mind now has a phenomenal form that is “conceptual” (\textit{savikalpaka}). In this third moment, the conceptualized phenomenal form loses the vividness or clarity that is characteristic of a perceptual form, and it is thus unclear (\textit{aspaśta}). That is, while the phenomenal form arising as a perceptual cognition through sensory contact is vivid or clear, the conceptual cognition of recognition following upon that nonconceptual cognition loses some degree of phenomenal clarity.\footnote{This raises the question of what Dharmakīrti means by a concept, and without going into great detail at this point, we can note some features that relate to the event-based, causal model he employs. In one of his last works, Dharmakīrti writes, “a concept is a cognition with a phenomenal appearance that is capable of being conjoined with linguistic expression.”\footnote{The qualification that the appearance—that is, the phenomenal form—is “capable” of being construed with a linguistic term is important because it is meant to point out that infants can have conceptual cognitions even though they do not yet have the ability to use language. As the commentator Dharmottara notes, “as long as the child who is seeing the nipple does not determine it to be what has been previously seen by thinking ‘this is that,’ he will not stop crying and direct his mouth to the nipple.”\footnote{Thus, even infants have conceptual cognitions because, as will also be discussed}}
later, a central feature of such a cognition is that the current contents of experience are construed as identical (ekikaraṇa) with previous experience. Thus, in the case of recognition, the interpretation of the perceptual phenomenal form as “blue” involves construing that phenomenal form as the same as a previously experienced phenomenal form. And this is precisely what it means for a mental event to be conceptual, namely, that it involves identifying two things as the “same.” This very minimal criterion for conceptuality means, among other things, that even animals can use concepts. Consider, for example, the scientific research conducted in the past decades on pigeons. It is now established that they have the capacity to recognize repeatedly pictures of fish, landscapes, and even the cartoon character Charlie Brown, despite their obvious lack of any evolutionary need to do so. This capacity to repeatedly identify Charlie Brown in various settings, sometimes with considerable distortion to his usual form, would indicate to Dharmakīrti that pigeons must be using concepts, even though they lack the capacity to mentally form an expression such as “that is Charlie Brown.”

Dharmakīrti’s minimalist approach to conceptual cognition is also reflected in the examples that he uses to articulate his theory of concept formation through apoha. In general, the examples involve only single terms, often articulated in simple expressions such as “this is a cow” or “this is a jug.” It seems clear that Dharmakīrti thus intends to examine not complex sentences, but simple predicative constructs that in at least some cases must be prelinguistic. These examples, along with the minimalist criteria that mark a cognition as conceptual, suggest that Dharmakīrti is not attempting to account for the formation of sentences or linguistically structured acts of predication, but rather that he seeks to articulate a more basic theory of what must be in place for more complex, linguistically structured cognition to be possible. If this view is correct, then we might best see his theory as explicating the very minimal form of conceptuality that is akin to “feature placement” (i.e., minimal cognitive events such as “blue here now”) as discussed by Jonardon Ganeri elsewhere in this volume.

DHARMAKĪRTI’S ONTOLOGY

A second topic that must be addressed before examining the central features of the apoha theory is Dharmakīrti’s ontology. In brief, Dharmakīrti follows the basic Buddhist rubric of the “two realities” (satyadvaya), the ultimate (paramārthasat) and the conventional (ṣaṃsvrtisat). For Dharmakīrti,
only causally efficient things are ultimately real. This claim rests largely on the notion that, to be known as real, a thing (or its effects) must impinge on the senses, for it is on the basis of sensory experience that we can assert the ultimate reality of a thing. Thus, in a paradigmatic sense, the causal efficacy of an ultimately real thing consists in its ability to causally interact with the senses in such a way that a phenomenal form of the thing is created in the next moment of consciousness in accord with the model described earlier. Indeed, it is this production of a phenomenal form through contact with a sensory object that comprises what Dharmakīrti calls “perception” (pratyakṣa). Hence, this also means that any object of perception must be ultimately real because only a causally efficient thing can participate in the causal process that leads to the creation of a perceptual phenomenal form.

By limiting ultimate reality to things that have the capacity to participate in a causal process, Dharmakīrti can deny ultimacy to universals—a denial that is directed at a large range of non-Buddhist thinkers who take real, extrametal universal to be the objects of (or at least required for) conceptual thought and language. Dharmakīrti’s denial of universals appeals to various arguments, and one line of reasoning points to the incoherence of maintaining that a real universal is either ontologically identical to or different from the particulars in which it is allegedly instantiated. Another approach appeals especially to the notion that, to be ultimately real, an entity must be causally efficacious. In the context of causal efficacy, many of Dharmakīrti’s arguments rest on two claims: causal efficacy requires change and change is incompatible with universals. If, for example, the universal “cowness” (gotva) were to change, then it would be something other than cowness, since to change is to become other. Thus, to change, “cowness” must become “noncowness,” and this would mean that all the objects qualified by cowness would suddenly become noncows. If, however, cowness does not change, then it cannot be causally efficacious because it could not move from a state of not producing a specific effect (for example, a phenomenal form in a perceptual event) to a state of producing that effect. Finally, alongside these technical arguments from causal efficacy comes a more commonsense approach: an assortment of particulars that we label “fire” actually produce heat, but that label or concept “fire” cannot boil our tea. Thus, whether due to the incompatibility between causal efficacy and a universal’s lack of change or the simple intuition that one cannot eat the idea of an “apple,” universals cannot be causally efficacious. Hence, in Dharmakīrti’s ontology, they can only be considered real in a conventional sense.
On this basis, Dharmakīrti denies the ultimate reality of universals, and that denial is consistent with his nominalist project. We should here note that Dharmakīrti’s notion of a universal differs significantly from the realist theories of philosophers such as the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara. Specifically, for realists such as Uddyotakara a universal exists in distinction from the conceptual cognition that apprehends it, but for Dharmakīrti a universal does not exist independent of a conceptual cognition. In rejecting the ultimate reality of universals, Dharmakīrti is denying that an expression or concept refers “in an affirmative manner” (vidhirūpa) to its referent by virtue of that referent’s instantiation of a real universal to which that expression or concept is related. By denying the reality of universals, Dharmakīrti makes this realist account impossible.

While denying the ultimate reality of universals, Dharmakīrti must still account for how conceptual cognitions can guide action in the world. This obligation stems in part from Dharmakīrti’s understanding of why we use concepts. As he puts it, we use concepts not simply out of some pernicious habit, but rather with a specific purpose or goal in mind. We might, for example, seek to heat ourselves in front of a fire, and we might then use the conceptual recognition of a fire—one following upon the nonconceptual perception of fire—to walk over and reach a real, particular fire that has the capacity to fulfill our telos (artha), the goal that we seek. On this understanding of why we use conceptual cognitions, Dharmakīrti is obliged to show how our words and concepts yield useful information that enables us to act effectively in the world, even without the presence of any ultimately real universal.

APOHA: A SUMMARY

Dharmakīrti’s problem, as we have sketched it, is to explain how concepts can provide useful information without any ontological commitment to the existence of universals, and his response to that problem is the apoha theory. This section presents a summary of the theory, and the following two sections examine some of its details: the notion of particulars having the same effect and the role of “imprints” (vāsanā). This chapter will conclude with a review of some key features of the apoha theory.

Overall, Dharmakīrti maintains that three different types of universals can be constructed through apoha: those based upon the real (i.e., particulars), those based upon the unreal, and those based upon both. To simplify our task, let us consider only the type of universals that are based upon real
things, most especially those relevant to the act of recognition sketched earlier. Dharmakīrti discusses this form of recognition in a key passage:

Having seen that things, although different, accomplish this or that telic function (arthakriyā) such as the [production of a] cognition, one joins those things with expressions that take as their object the difference from things that are other than those [that accomplish the aforementioned telos]. Having done so, then when one sees another thing [with that telic capacity], one has a recognition of it [as being the same as the aforementioned things].

(PV I.98–99aB)

And in his commentary, Dharmakīrti explains:

It has already been said [at PV I.75] that even though [some] things, such as the eye and so on, are distinct, they accomplish the same telic function. [A person] sees that among [things], some accomplish that same telic function, such as the [production of] a cognition; as such those things are [conceptually] distinguished from the others [that do not perform that function]. Those things thus produce, by their very nature as real things (vastudharmatayā), a false awareness in [that person]; that awareness is associated with expressions that have as their object the exclusion [of those things] from [the others] that do not perform that [aforementioned function]. This false awareness is [the recognition] “this is that.” It arises because the imprint [placed in the mind by that person’s previous experience] has been activated [by what s/he is presently seeing]. [In this cognitive act of recognition] the difference [among those unique things] is glossed over (samsrṣṭabheda).

In terms of the basic contours of the apoha theory, this passage is useful for understanding how, in the absence of real universals, a concept such as fire can be applied nonrandomly to only some objects. For Dharmakīrti, the explanation is that one constructs a sameness for a class of objects on the basis of their difference from other objects. The warrant for that construction is that every object is in fact completely unique in its causal capacities or “telic function” (arthakriyā). In the construction of a sameness that applies to certain objects, however, one focuses on a subset of causal capacities that are relevant to one’s telos or goal (artha), and one thus ignores other capacities that distinguish even the objects we call “fire” from each other. The sameness that applies to all fires is thus, strictly speak-
ing, a negation: it is the exclusion (vyāṛtti) of all other things that do not accomplish the desired telic function. Since each individual fire is actually unique, the conceptual awareness formed through exclusion is “false” (mithyā) or “erroneous” (bhrānta) in that it presents those objects as the same. Nevertheless, since it is rooted in their causal characteristics, that “erroneous” awareness can successfully guide one to objects that will accomplish one’s goals.

In presenting the apoha theory, the passage also draws on the causal model of cognition discussed earlier. As noted previously, the act of perception consists of a phenomenal form being generated in consciousness by the interaction of the senses with an object. When an act of recognition is to occur, a perceptual phenomenal form activates an “imprint” (vāsanā) such that the phenomenal form in a subsequent moment of consciousness is now construed in terms of an exclusion that forms a class of entities. The phenomenal form is thus conceptualized in an act of recognition whose minimal structure would be “this is that.”

The successful act of recognition thus involves an appeal both to a regular causal process and to the conditioning preserved as “imprints” in the perceiver’s mind. In terms of the appeal to causal characteristics, the causal model of perception requires that the phenomenal form that arises through contact with the object is an effect of the perceptual process, and since it arises through a causal process, that phenomenal form is a particular. As a particular, each phenomenal form is utterly unique, and it cannot be distributed over other particulars. Hence, phenomenal forms themselves cannot account for the universal—the “sameness” (sāmānya)—that enables us to see one object and then another and recognize that the two are the same, for example, that they are both “fire.”

Nevertheless, each phenomenal form, precisely because it is a unique particular, can be the basis for the construction of the appropriate universal. As noted earlier, a particular is necessarily causally efficacious, and this means that it arises from causes and produces effects. Moreover, the range of effects that it can produce is restricted by the causes from which it has arisen. A particular’s uniqueness thus amounts to the fact that it has arisen from specific causes and that it therefore is capable of producing a restricted range of effects. If we consider a phenomenal form that arises from what we would call “fire,” that phenomenal form (a mental particular) is unique or “excluded” (vyāṛtta) from all other particulars in that no other particulars arise from exactly the same causes or produce exactly the same effects. The phenomenal form, being the unique effect of the unique
particulars that produced it, thus serves as the basis for excluding the phenomenal forms produced by other particulars.\footnote{21}

The view, however, that each phenomenal form excludes all others by virtue of its uniqueness is not in itself adequate to account for our use of concepts: we require a notion of sameness and not just difference. We must have some notion of sameness because we need to account for \textit{anvaya}, the “repeatability,” “distribution,” or “continuity” applicable to any cognition that involves construing two or more things as the “same” (\textit{eka}). When we reflect on the conceptual cognition of “fire,” for example, it appears to assume a “fireness” that is present in multiple instances, and in this sense the concept of \textit{fire} has \textit{anvaya}. Here we encounter the relevance of factors occurring in the mind in which the concept will arise. One such factor is the imprint of previous experience, which we will discuss in greater detail later. Another factor is the set of expectations that arise from having a particular goal, one that Dharmakīrti always frames as obtaining the desirable or avoiding the undesirable. These essentially behavioral goals create a “desire to know” (\textit{jijñāsa}), that is, a need for information about what will or will not accomplish that goal. This desire to know, in turn, places “limits” (\textit{avadhis}) on the causes and effects upon which we focus. In other words, we have expectations about what we wish to obtain or avoid, and our concepts are constructed in relation to those expectations.\footnote{22}

In the case of the concept \textit{fire}, some set of interests—such as the desire for warmth—or other such dispositions prompt us to construe the phenomenal form in question as distinct from entities that do not have the causal characteristics expected of what we call “fire.” At the same time, we ignore other criteria, such as having the causal characteristics expected of that which is “smoky” or “fragrant,” because these are not part of what we desire to know, so as to accomplish our goals. When we look at an object that we will call “fire,” it produces a phenomenal form that, given the context of our expectations, activates the imprint of a previous experience. Both the current phenomenal form and the form that arose in the previous experience exclude all forms that we would not call “fire”; but suppose that the current fire is smoky, while the previously experienced fire was not. Indeed, from Dharmakīrti’s ontological perspective the two fires really are not the same at all, but our desire to achieve a goal—such as warming our hands—that is accomplished by fire creates a context that compels us to ignore these differences. And since we have ignored the differences between those two phenomenal forms—the current one and the one that caused the imprint—we can construe both of them as mutually qualified by a negation,
namely, their difference from phenomenal forms that do not activate the imprints for the concept *fire*. That mutual difference, which Dharmakīrti calls an “exclusion” (*vyāṛtti*), thus becomes their nondifference. In short, that exclusion or nondifference pertains to all things that are different from those that do not have the expected causal characteristics—in this case the causal characteristics expected of that which we call “fire.” In this way, exclusions, being formed on the basis of the phenomenal forms in conceptual cognitions, are construed as negations that qualify those forms. Thus, while the phenomenal forms themselves are completely unique—they do not have *anvaya* and thus are not distributed over other instances—they can be construed as qualified by a negation that does have *anvaya*, inasmuch as that negation applies to all the instances in question because they exclude what is not a “fire.”

Dharmakīrti thus arrives at a theory of universals (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) that requires both the phenomenal form and the exclusion. That is, strictly speaking, a universal is a combination of that which is not distributed (i.e., lacks *anvaya*) and that which is distributed. The phenomenal form, as a mental particular, is not distributed, but the exclusion (*vyāṛtti*), as a negation applicable to all the phenomenal forms in question, is distributed. Lacking distribution, the phenomenal form alone cannot be the universal. But in Dharmakīrti’s theory of qualities, a negation cannot exist in distinction from that which it qualifies; therefore, the negation alone also cannot be the universal. The universal must therefore be a phenomenal form that we construe in terms of a particular type of negation, namely, the exclusion of that which does not have the expected effects. However, to apply this negation to all the phenomenal forms in question, one must construe all the phenomenal forms in question as having the same effect. Let us examine this important issue in greater detail.

**CONCERNING SAMENESS OF EFFECT**

Dharmakīrti claims that a universal is constructed on the basis of the exclusion of all the entities in question from those that do not have the expected causal characteristics. Dharmakīrti recognizes, however, that if certain things—such as those called “jugs”—are excluded from others because those others do not have the expected causal characteristics, one is also asserting that all the things we call “jugs” have the same causal characteristics, namely, those expected of a “jug.” For Dharmakīrti, this amounts to the claim that, in the case of all jugs, we may identify at least some of their
causes as the “same” (eka), and most importantly, we may likewise identify at least some of their effects as the “same.”

Dharmakīrti’s focus upon sameness of effect becomes particularly salient when he presents his apoha theory in terms of the act of recognition discussed earlier. As noted previously, when an object is perceived, it produces a sensory cognition containing a phenomenal form that, being a (mental) particular, is no less unique than the object that produced it. If Dharmakīrti were to claim that objects are the same because those effects—the phenomenal forms they produce—are the “same” (eka), then it seems that he must contradict his ontology of particulars: if he says that two phenomenal forms, which are mental particulars, are the same, then how can he say that all particulars are unique? Speaking in the voice of an objector, and using “cognition” to refer to the phenomenal form, Dharmakīrti puts the problem this way:

But each cognition is an effect of those individuals, and cognition is different [PV I.108cd] for each real thing. That is, as with the individual that caused the awareness, the cognition in which it appears is distinct; therefore, how can all those specific individuals have the same effect? For the cognition is their effect, and it is different in each case. In other words, the single effect of jugs and so on, such as bearing water, is different for each substance because the substances are different. Hence, those individuals, being different, do not have the same effect.

To avoid this problem, Dharmakīrti maintains that the cognitions—that is, the cognitions with phenomenal forms related through causality to their objects—are not what account for the sameness of those objects’ effects. Instead, those cognitions themselves act as causes for another cognition, a “judgment” (pratyavamarṣaṇāṇa) in which the thing in question is construed as the “same” (eka) as other things. He explains:

This is not a problem, because the cognition produced by each individual in question is nondifferent since each cognition is the cause of a judgment [of the individual as] the same [as the other individuals in question]. And since they are the causes of the same cognitions, the individuals are also nondifferent.

Dharmakīrti admits that the cognition—or more precisely, the phenomenal form—produced by each object is indeed unique. Hence, one cannot directly use those phenomenal forms as the warrant for the claim that the ob-
jects are the same because they have the same effect. If those phenomenal forms are the basis for the construal of the objects that produced the phenomenal forms as the same, then Dharmakīrti must first show how those phenomenal forms—the effects of the objects—are themselves the same. To do so, he once again turns to the principle that entities are the same if they produce the same effect. That is, he maintains that those phenomenal forms are all the same because they all produce the same effect, namely, a judgment (pratyavamasajñāna) that presents the aforementioned phenomenal form in such a way that it appears to be the same as the others. Thus, all the phenomenal forms can be the same in that each leads to a judgment, such as “this is fire,” that presents its content—the phenomenal form—as the same as the content of the other judgments, inasmuch as in each case the content is presented as “fire.” With this point in place, Dharmakīrti can then maintain that, if those phenomenal forms are the same because each leads to a judgment in which the phenomenal form is presented to be the same as the others, then one can also say that the objects that produced those phenomenal forms in the first place are all the same because they too produce that effect. Thus, the warrant for the sameness of the objects is that they produce the same effect: the phenomenal forms. And the warrant for the sameness of the phenomenal forms is again that they produce the same effect: a certain type of judgment in which each phenomenal form is presented to be the same as the others.

As we have described it so far, this theory leaves itself open to an obvious rebuttal: what warrants the sameness of the judgments? That is, Dharmakīrti’s initial problem is that objects are unique, so the sameness required by language and concepts must be accounted for by sameness of effect. But if he turns to the phenomenal forms produced by those objects, he has the same problem because those cognitions, like the objects themselves, are unique. If he now turns to the claim that those phenomenal forms are the same because they produce the same judgment, then he appears to have fallen into an infinite regress. In other words, it would appear that we need, once again, to warrant the sameness of those judgments by appealing to the sameness of their effects; and of course, the sameness of the judgments’ effects will once again require the same warrant, and so on.

Dharmakīrti’s response to this problem is expressed, if somewhat elliptically, in his commentary on the verse cited earlier. Note that here he uses the metaphor of an “overlap” or “mixing” (saṃsarga) of objects whereby the nature of one is somehow partially present in the nature of the other. For Dharmakīrti, such an overlap is impermissible in the case of causally efficient things, since causally efficient entities are particulars, and they
must be unique. At the same time, what it means for two objects to be conceptually construed as the “same” in the relevant way is precisely that the conceptual cognition presents them as overlapping in some fashion—for example, overlapping in that they are both “fire.” With this and other such issues in mind, he comments on the aforementioned verse:

It has already been explained that the natures of things (bhāva) do not overlap, and that a cognition of a thing in which the phenomenal form presents a thing as if its nature overlapped with other things is an error. However, those distinct things indirectly (krameṇa) become the causes for concepts; as such, they produce a conceptual cognition in which they seem to overlap, and they do so “by their nature.” Moreover, this is called their “nondifferent difference”—namely, their exclusion (viveka) from other things that by nature do not cause that effect; they are understood to be excluded in this fashion because they cause some same effect, such as a cognition. In terms of the cognition that each individual produces, even though it is different for every substance, the cognition appears nondifferent from the others in that by its nature the cognition causes a judgment [of its content] as the same [as the others]; that is, the judgment overlays the phenomenal form in the awareness with a nondifference. The individuals in question cause a thing (artha) such as an awareness [in which the phenomenal form] appears nondifferent [from the others] and which in turn causes that kind of judgment. Therefore, those individuals through their nature produce the same cognition with a phenomenal form that presents them as overlapping whose ultimate [object] is their difference in nature (svabhāvabheda) from all other things, as has been repeatedly stated. Therefore, the nondifference of things consists of the fact that they have the same effect.

Dharmakīrti’s solution to the problem of infinite regress is that sameness of effect does not act as the warrant for the sameness of the judgments in question. Instead, he cleverly shifts what he means by being “the same” (eka). The judgments are the same not because they have the same effect, but because they phenomenally present their content as the “same”: by overlaying the phenomenal forms in the cognitions that produce them with a “nondifference” (abheda), each judgment presents its phenomenal content to be the same as the previously experienced phenomenal content. This amounts to an appeal to some unspecified combination of experience and mental dispositions: when we look at certain things, we just interpret
them all as “fire,” in the context formed by previous experience, certain dispositions, and the way that we use the term “fire.” This appeal to experience and dispositions highlights the importance of mind dependency or “subjective factors” in the process of constructing exclusions. That is, Dharmakīrti maintains that when we construct exclusions, we do not do so haphazardly or out of some pernicious habit; rather, we have some purpose in mind, and that purpose provides expectations and interests that form the context of our concept formation. An apple and a strawberry, for example, will be different if we are concerned with their distinctive effects, but if we are only concerned with their coloration, we ignore that difference in light of the sameness constructed in terms of color. And of course, our use of “apple” and “strawberry” is dependent on our habituation to certain linguistic practices. And, as we will see later, questions of habituation and dispositions relate closely to Dharmakīrti’s notion of “imprints” (vāsanā).

While Dharmakīrti’s appeal to experience and dispositions reflects the mind-dependent aspects of the exclusion process, it is coupled with something more: an appeal to the nature (prakṛti or svabhāva) of things themselves. That is, when several objects produce cognitions that in turn produce the same judgment, “this is fire,” it is not just my own expectations, conditioning, and other relevant dispositions that go into the construction of that exclusion. Rather, beyond my own subjectivity, the entities in question by their nature (svabhāvataḥ, prakṛtyā, etc.) produce cognitions whose content is capable of being construed as “fire.” In combination with mind-dependent factors, this assertion of the nature of things puts an end to any infinite regress. We can pose the question “but why do those objects all produce cognitions that can lead to the same judgment?” And Dharmakīrti can answer, “because it is their nature to do so.”

Some interpreters may feel rather dissatisfied with Dharmakīrti’s appeal to nature. In effect, he is saying that when we can call all fires “fire,” for example, it is not that they all instantiate the universal “fireness”; nor that they all possess some real, specifiable similarity; nor even that they all have the “same” effect in a way that we can ultimately specify in objective terms. Rather, all those things are just different from nonfire things, and the reason for their difference is simply that by their nature they appear that way to us when we attend to what we mean by “fire.” Even the seeming objectivity of this appeal to nature may disappoint some, for a thing’s “nature” (svabhāva) is also conceptually constructed through the apoha theory. On this interpretation of what Dharmakīrti means by nature, Dharmakīrti’s talk about the nature of things that we call “fire” is best understood as a way of saying that, in ultimate terms, there is no metaphysically defensible
reason for the fact that we call them “fire.” Thus, if one is hoping for an ultimately defensible metaphysical reason, then Dharmakīrti’s answer to the problem of sameness is dissatisfying. On the other hand, one might suppose that we are engaged in a frustrating and fruitless enterprise when we yearn to specify in precise terms the metaphysical warrant for our use of the term “fire.” In that case, Dharmakīrti’s answer is quite satisfactory, or perhaps even liberating.

IMPRINTS

We have seen that, in a context such as recognition, a universal is constructed on the basis of a thing’s causal characteristics, and the universal is not arbitrary because it is constrained both in terms of the object and the subject. Objectively, it is the appeal to a thing’s nature—that is, its causal characteristics—that places constraints on the formation of the concept. Since there is an infinite number of things from which an object may be differentiated, an unlimited number of universals may be constructed for that thing. Nevertheless, to be formed “on the basis of a real thing” (bhāvāśraya), the universal must be constrained by the causal characteristics of the thing in question; hence, even though an infinite number of universals can be properly constructed for any thing, an infinite number of universals also cannot be properly constructed because they would not conform to the thing’s causal characteristics.

Elsewhere, I have argued that this appeal to an object’s nature includes a covert reliance on regularities in the features of minds because even though seemingly objective, an object’s nature is in part mind dependent for Dharmakīrti. An even more obvious appeal to some kind of regularity in minds, however, is his explicit reliance on imprints (vāsanā) as playing a key role in the construction of concepts through apoha. Imprints clearly lie on the subject side, and they stand alongside other subject- or mind-located constraints, such as expectations, context, conventions, and so on. All of these may be thought of as involving conditioning (samskāraṇa), but imprints play a special role in this regard.

In general, “imprints” (vāsanā) are a mechanism for the expression of karma, especially on the Yogācāra model, and Yogācāra idealism is Dharmakīrti’s final view. In the Yogācāra system, these imprints are stored in a type of subliminal or implicit consciousness known as the “storehouse” or “receptacle” consciousness (ālayavijñāna), the theory of which Dharmakīrti explicitly refers to and adopts, at least in part. Accord-
ing to the Yogācāra system before Dharmakīrti, imprints continue to add seeds to the storehouse, and these imprints in turn can be later activated, thus causing effects on experience. One way of understanding the theory of the storehouse is that it thus solves a central problem of the Buddhist notion of karma, namely, how it is that past intentions and actions can yield significant effects in the (continually reborn) mindstream, even over vast periods of time. To some extent, the theory of imprints and the storehouse probably serve similar purposes for Dharmakīrti, though his exact relationship to the Yogācāra tradition that precedes him remains unclear. What is clear is that, in employing the technical vocabulary of imprints, Dharmakīrti also bends it to his specific purpose, namely, accounting for the way that conceptuality operates.24

A complete account of Dharmakīrti’s notion of imprints not only is beyond the scope of this chapter, but also may not be possible. Although he refers repeatedly to imprints, the precise mechanism of their operation receives no attention. Nevertheless, as is clear from the passage on recognition cited earlier, he clearly distinguishes two basic forms of imprints: those that are “placed” (āhita) in the storehouse by experiences and those that are innate or “beginningless” (anādi). Both types of imprint play crucial roles in the apoha theory. As noted previously, in the act of recognition, a phenomenal form arises when, with other cognitive conditions in place, an object comes into relation with a sense faculty; when the act of recognition ensues, that phenomenal form activates an imprint from a previous experience, and the object that caused the current phenomenal form is construed to be the same as the object that caused a phenomenal form at that time. It is the placement of this imprint that crucially allows for the fundamental “unification” or “construal as the same” (ekikarana) which is the principal marker of conceptual cognition in Dharmakīrti’s system. Without an imprint of previous experience that could be activated by the present experience, there would be no possibility of recognizing the contents of present experience as identical with what has been perceived before.

The imprint placed by previous experience plays a crucial role, but it cannot account in itself for all that is necessary for a concept to be formed through apoha. Consider a phenomenal form of, for example, an object that can be correctly called a “fire.” That object should be capable of creating a phenomenal form that leads to concepts other than “fire”; depending on the specific characteristics of that object, the mind might form any number of other concepts, such as “light” or “visible object.” There is something about the phenomenal form that performs the “exclusion”
(vyāvṛtti) of these other possibilities—that is, there is something about the phenomenal form that inhibits the activation of imprints that would lead to the construal of the object not as a “fire” but rather as light and so on. Obviously, the imprint of previous experience itself cannot be what inhibits the activation of other imprints, because if the imprint of the previous experience of “fire” excludes the imprint for “light,” then the object could only be construed as “fire” and never as “light.” For Dharmakīrti it is clear that one of the major factors in inhibiting these other imprints is precisely the goal-oriented expectations that are present in the moments of mind prior to the arising of the phenomenal form. That form thus arises as conditioned by such expectations, which themselves are generally articulated in terms of obtaining the desirable or avoiding the undesirable. Conditioned by expectations focused on such a goal, the phenomenal form that arises is thus one that is primed for the imprint of “fire” to be activated, or perhaps more accurately it is biased against the activation of irrelevant imprints.

The imprint of a previous experience must thus be supplemented by some other cognitive factors such as expectations, but even this is not enough to explain how the concept arises. Recall that for Dharmakīrti the previously experienced object and the presently experienced object are actually not identical in any way at all. Ontologically, they are entirely distinct, and the raw, uninterpreted phenomenal forms initially arising in perception are also not actually identical even in their phenomenal appearance. So why would they ever be construed as the same? How would one first learn, even before the acquisition of language, the capacity to identify past experience with present experience if, in fact, the two experiences are not actually the same? According to Dharmakīrti, the answer is that one does not need to learn to do so because one’s mind already has a powerful imprint—which might be better called a disposition—that causes one to identify objects as the same in an automatic fashion. This disposition is not learned; indeed, on Dharmakīrti’s view it would be impossible to acquire it through experience because this would require an experience of two objects that are in fact the same, but for Dharmakīrti all perceptible objects are necessarily different in all ways.

This imprint is termed “beginningless” by Dharmakīrti in that it is a fundamental disposition in the mind of any sentient organism that has not acquired the capacity to eliminate it. In this sense the imprint might best be called “innate” in that it is not acquired, but is rather part of a sentient being’s cognitive architecture just by virtue of being a sentient being. More specifically, it is the innate capacity to form concepts, defined in the mini-
nal sense which even pigeons are capable of. If one adopts the perspective of evolutionary psychology, this fundamental disposition would provide a key evolutionary advantage in avoiding previously experienced dangers or approaching previously experienced opportunities—or, in Dharmakīrtian terms, it is necessary for the acts of recognition involved in obtaining the desirable and avoiding the undesirable. At the same time, however, this fundamental disposition radically distorts our experience of the world, such that we treat things that are actually different—the person I met a year ago and the person I am seeing now—as if they were the same. This distortion is so pervasive and it leads to such a dysfunctional engagement with the world that Dharmakīrti calls it “ignorance” (avidyā).

Even with this fundamental capacity for (erroneously) identifying an object with a previously experienced object, one other aspect of the apoha process needs to be accounted for by an appeal to yet another kind of imprint. In brief, the difficulty here is a discontinuity between phenomenal content and reference. What is actually presented in the conceptual cognition of fire is a phenomenal form, but that phenomenal form lacks the capacity to produce heat and so on; only an actual fire has such capacities. Hence, for the concept to guide effective action, its phenomenality must be ignored and it must be treated as if it were the object, such as an actual fire, that it represents. Another innate imprint—and again, the best translation here would be “disposition”—accounts for this feature of conceptual cognition. As with the innate disposition that provides the automatic ability to see different things as the same, this imprint is obviously useful. If one needed to reflect upon the phenomenal representations in conceptual cognitions so as to understand that they are actually pointing to something in the world, conceptual thought would become hugely inefficient. One would lose much of the advantage in being able to recognize that what one is hearing now is the same lion’s roar that one heard previously. Instead, to sustain the practical efficiency of conceptuality, the mind must automatically mistake the concept for the object that it represents. As with the other innate disposition, however, this erroneous feature of conceptuality comes at a price because it also involves a distortion. Perhaps the problem here is best illustrated by moving beyond Dharmakīrti to contemporary psychology where, according to one prominent variation on cognitive behavior therapy, the tendency to mistake thoughts for reality can become so dominant and rigid that it leads to the psychopathology of “cognitive fusion” and the behavioral dysfunction (such as pathological avoidance) that ensues.
CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF CONCEPTS

Dharmakīrti’s formulation of the apoha theory stems from his nominalist rejection of real universals, and one might suppose that he would therefore view concepts as somehow weakened or unimportant. After all, concepts are not ultimately real. Yet the need to provide a thorough account of concept formation points to the opposite conclusion, namely, that Dharmakīrti believes conceptual cognition to be crucial to his project. The centrality of conceptual cognitions becomes especially apparent when Dharmakīrti explains a key feature of Buddhist contemplative practice, namely, that the repeated contemplation of key concepts can itself transform an individual. To conclude this chapter, let us consider briefly the way that Dharmakīrti explains this transformative role of concepts.

We have seen that the phenomenal form plays an especially important role in the apoha theory. In the case of recognition, for example, it provides the causal link between the concept and the particular. Because it is an appearance in the mind, the phenomenal form also explains how conceptual cognition can have a positive content, even though what accounts for the “sameness” in the cognition is actually the negation that Dharmakīrti calls an “exclusion” (vyāvṛttti). Likewise, since the phenomenal form is construed in terms of a beginningless imprint that makes one mistake it for the actual object to which it refers, a conceptual cognition can provoke one to act on an object in the world, even though the phenomenal form that is actually appearing in the cognition is not actually that object.37

Phenomenal forms have to do with the content of experience, and in the context of contemplative practice, Dharmakīrti is especially concerned with the notion that one can have a direct, nonconceptual experience that is transformative. This direct experience, however, must somehow be of specific concepts, such as selflessness and impermanence, that are the objects of the contemplative’s practice. The question then is, on Dharmakīrti’s theory of concepts, how is it possible to move from a vague, conceptual cognition to a vivid, nonconceptual one? Dharmakīrti alludes to the theoretical basis for such events:

A cognition that apprehends a linguistic object (artha) is a conceptual cognition of that [object] which it is cognizing. The actual nature [of any cognition qua mental event] is not a linguistic object; therefore, any [awareness of awareness itself] is direct [and hence nonconceptual].38

(PV III.287)
Previously we noted that in the formation of a concept through the apoha or exclusion process, a phenomenal form is presented in such a way that it becomes vague—not vivid like a perceptual phenomenal form. In short, the image is vague in that it is not a phenomenally clear depiction of the object that it represents. Nevertheless, even though the judgment’s image is vague as a representation, it is nevertheless an image. In other words, the judgment does contain some type of phenomenal content. And as a mental event, that phenomenal content is a real mental particular that can be known in its nature as a mental event through reflexive awareness (svasamvitti). In relation to that reflexive awareness, however, the content no longer appears to stand for something else; that is, it is no longer conceptual. In other words, as that which is known through reflexive awareness, every cognition—even every conceptual cognition—is a mental particular.

In this way, Dharmakīrti proposes what might be called a “Janus-faced” theory of concepts, which he explains most succinctly in another passage. There, an objector says, “if [a universal] is also a real object (arthā) in terms of having the nature of awareness, then you would have to conclude [that it is a particular]” (PV III.9cd). In other words, if the phenomenal content of a conceptual cognition can be known reflexively as a mental event, then it would seem that universals, the objects of conceptual cognitions, must be ultimately real, since they would be known through perception, albeit the unusual form of perception that is reflexive awareness. Dharmakīrti responds, “since we do indeed assert [that a universal is a particular], your statement poses no problem for us. But it is a universal because it [is imagined to have] the same form for all [the objects that it seems to qualify. It has that same form] because it is based upon their exclusion [from other objects that do not have the expected causal characteristics]” (PV III.10).

Thus, when construed as a sameness distributed over a class of particulars, a concept is a universal; but considered as a mental event, the concept is a particular. In this way, inasmuch as it is distributed over a class of things, a universal is actually a negation, since on Dharmakīrti’s view, only a negation formed through exclusion can be distributed in this way. But inasmuch as the negation is not ontologically distinct from the mental image that occurs in the conceptual cognition, that cognition is a particular qua mental event. The one proviso that must be added is that, when considered as a mental event, the conceptual cognition loses its distribution, and when it loses its distribution, it is no longer a concept.

This Janus-faced aspect of concepts gives us a means to explain how a contemplative can focus repeatedly on a concept and, through that contemplation, eventually arrive at a cognition that is now clear and vivid—
a cognition that is now a “yogic perception” \(\text{yogipratyakṣa}\). Dharmakīrti compares this process to the hallucinations of a lovesick man: When the man focuses intently and repeatedly on the memory (a concept) of his beloved, he is in part focusing on a mental event, which is a particular. With sufficient and intense repetition, he will have a clear experience—a perception—of that event itself. The contemplative follows the same type of process, and her efforts also result in a nonconceptual knowledge of a concept qua phenomenal form.\(^{41}\) Hence, Dharmakīrti says, “therefore, that to which one meditatively conditions oneself, whether it be real or unreal, will result in a clear, nonconceptual cognition when the meditation is perfected” (PV III.285).\(^{42}\)

In this way, for Dharmakīrti, concepts can become a powerful means of inducing experiences that transform—or distort—the mind. It would seem that although concepts are ultimately unreal, they are still potent and, in some cases, dangerous.

Notes

1. For Bhāvaviveka’s dates, see Eckel 2008, 25. For Bhāvaviveka’s critique and response to the apoha theory, see the translation of V.60–68 in Eckel 2008, 265–273.

2. In his influential article on the topic, Kim 1988 uses this phrase (“an empirical psychological study of our cognitive processes”) to gloss a central element in Quine’s groundbreaking work on what it means for epistemology to be naturalized. Kim also sees Quine’s project as requiring the abandonment of normativity; it is “to go out of the business of justification” (380), and in this respect the “naturalization” may not suit Dharmakīrti’s project. Nevertheless, Kim also notes that, on his reading of Quine, naturalized epistemology should be a “law-based predictive-explanatory theory, like any other theory within empirical science; its principal job is to see how human cognizers develop theories (their ‘picture of the world’) from observation (‘the stimulus of their sensory receptors’)” (389). It does not seem implausible to treat Dharmakīrti’s approach in a similar manner—that is, as a project whose goal is a careful and largely empirical description of embodied human cognition.

3. It is worth noting, however, that there is also considerable convergence. For an accessible work on the emotions in this regard, see the Dalai Lama and Paul Ekman 2008.

4. A thorough account of the Abhidharma, especially in terms of its analysis of cognitive and affective states, is not yet available in a Western language. A helpful work in this direction is the second chapter in Waldron 2003. See also Potter et al., 1998. Abhidharma metaphysics has received more attention, and a good starting point is the chapter on Abhidharma in Siderits 2007.

5. The notion that the phenomenal forms in conceptual cognitions lack phenomenal clarity arises in various contexts for Dharmakīrti, but it is especially
evident in his notion of yogic perception, as discussed in the conclusion of this chapter.


7. NBT 25 (ed. Shastri): “bālo ‘pi hi yāvad dṛṣṭyānāṃ stanaṃ sa evyām iti pūrvadrṣṭtvatvena na pratayavamṛṣati tāvan noparatarudito murkham arpayati stane.”

8. The earliest publications in this area include Hernstein and Loveland 1964; Siegel and Honig 1970; Hernstein, Loveland and Cable 1976; and several others.

9. The crux of the matter is stated in perhaps its most succinct form by Dharmakīrti when he says, “to be is to be perceived” (PVSV ad PV I.3, ed. Gnoli, 4.2: “sattvam upalabdhir eva”). The corollary is that, minimally, a real thing must have the capacity for the “projection” (arpāna) of its own phenomenal form into awareness. See PVSV ad PV I.282 (ed. Gnoli, 149.21 ff.). Note that all the passages from PV and PVSV cited in this chapter are translated in Dunne 2004.

10. For a more detailed account, see Dunne 2004, 84–89.

11. For the general contours of this debate and references to recent work on the topic, see Dunne 2004.

12. For an extensive treatment of momentariness and the varieties of arguments in its favor, see Oetke 1993. A list of relevant passages in PV and PVSV is given in Dunne 2004, 97n68. For the question of permanence as applied to universals, a representative passage is found in PVSV ad PV I.144a (ed. Gnoli, 21 ff.).

13. Dharmakīrti makes this point at a few junctures in his works, but perhaps the most amusing is his remark that, if one is interested in accomplishing a goal, one is not concerned with the reality or unreality of the universals appearing phenomenally in awareness, just as a lustful woman would not bother to inquire whether a eunuch is handsome or not! For a translation of the relevant passages, see Dunne 2004, 310–312.

14. The most concise statement of the causal inefficiency—and hence irreality—of universals is found in the Svaṭṛti (PVSV ad PV I.166, ed. Gnoli, 84.10): “tasmat sarvam sāmānyam anarthakriyāyogyatvād avastu.” See also PV III.1–3 and the amusing metaphor of the eunuch (PVSV ad PV I.210–211, ed. Gnoli, 106.27–107.9).

15. See PVSV ad PV I.93 (ed. Gnoli, 45.32–46.9).

16. PVSV ad PV I.68–75, translated in the appendix to Dunne 2004, contains a number of the arguments discussed in the remainder of this chapter. My discussion builds on the work of many others (see Dunne 2004 for references), as well as more recent contributions by Patil (2003) and Arnold (2006).

17. PVSV (ed. Gnoli, 49.16ff.): “jñānādyarthakriyāṁtāṁ tūṣṭvābhede ‘pikurvatah/arthaṁ tadanyaviśesaviṣayair dhvanibhiḥ saha / saṃyojya pratyabhijñānaṃ kuryād apy anyadarśane.”

18. PVSV (ed. Gnoli, 49.19ff.): “uktam etat bhedā ‘pi bhāvās tulyārthakriyāṁkāriṇāś caksurādād ida / tama ekām jñānādikām arthakriyām teṣu paśyato vastudharmatayavāṁyebhyo bhidyamānaḥ bhāvās tadvyavṛttivāṣayadvānsārṣṭam tad evedam iti svānuḥbhavāsānānarabdhaṃ saṃsṛṣṭabhadham mithyāpratyayaṃ janayanti.”

19. On the three types of universals, see PVSV ad PV I.191 (Gnoli,95.19ff.) and PV III.51cd (ed. Śāṅkṛtyāyana): “sāmānyam trividham tac ca bhāvābhāvobhāyāśrayāt.”
20. See, for example, PVSV ad PV I.166 (ed. Gnoli, 84.22–85.2) and chapter 3 in Dunne 2004.

21. The notion that uniqueness of particulars is ultimately the basis for constructing universals through exclusion is expressed at numerous points, including: PVSV ad PV I.70 (ed. Gnoli, 38.17ff.); PV I.72cd and PVSV ad cit. (ed. Gnoli, 49.16ff.); PVSV ad PV I.64 (ed. Gnoli, 35.2–3); and PV III.169 (ed. Sāṃkṛtyāyana).

22. The basic role of expectations in the construction of universals is indicated by the repeated use of the term abhināma (“expected”) with relation to the causes and effects on the basis of which a universal is constructed. See, for example, PVSV ad PV I.93. See also the reference to abhiprāya in PV I.68–70 and PVSV ad cit. (ed. Gnoli, 39.8). The notion of the negative “limit” (avādhi) in opposition to which an exclusion is constructed appears to occur only once in the Svaṅgṛṛṭti (i.e., PVSV ad PV I.185).

23. The notion that certain entities may be considered nondifferent because they are all different from all other entities is emphasized at several places, including PVSV ad PV I.75d (ed. Gnoli, 42.6ff.), PVSV ad PV I.95cd (ed. Gnoli, 48.4) and especially in PVSV ad PV I.117–142 (see the appendix to Dunne 2004).

24. Although Dharmakīrti specifically discusses the construction of universals in terms of entities having the same types of causes, he tends to focus upon sameness of effect. Passages that mention both ways of constructing sameness include PVSV ad PV I.117–142 (ed. Gnoli, 68.24–69.2). Other examples include PVSV ad PV I.40–42 (ed. Gnoli, 25.19–23), PVSV ad PV I.64 (ed. Gnoli, 35.2–4), and PVSV ad PV I.75d (ed. Gnoli, 42.5–8).


27. Although Dharmakīrti could be referring to a number of passages, a likely candidate is PV I.68–75 and PVSV ad cit.


29. This appeal to the nature of things becomes apparent when, in a related context, Dharmakīrti remarks: “Indeed, it is not correct (naa . . . raṭṭi) to question (paryanuyoga) the natures of things, as in “why does fire burn? why is it hot, and
water is not?” One should just ask this much, “from what cause does a thing with this nature come?” \[PVSV\ ad PV I.167ab (ed. Gnoli, 84.19–21): “na hi svabhāvā bhāvānaṁ paryanuyogaṁ arhanti kim agnir uṣno vā nodakam iti / etāvat tu syāt kuto ‘yam svabhāva iti.”

31. Ibid.
32. The term “imprint” (vāsanā), including the notion of “beginningless” (anādi-) imprints, occurs numerous times in Dharmakīrti’s works, often in connection with the apoha theory. In the PVSV alone, it occurs repeatedly in these discussions related to apoha: PVSV ad PV I.58, PV I.64, PV I.68–70, PV I.72, PV I.75, PV I.98–99, PV I.106–107, PV I.151–152, PV I.161, PV I.205, PV I.238, and PV I.286.
33. Dharmakīrti assumes a Yogācāra stance at various points in his works, but perhaps the most sustained treatment is found beginning at PV III.333.
34. For more on the notion of the imprints and the storehouse consciousness, see Waldron 2003 and Schmithausen 1987.
37. For more on these features of the phenomenal form, see Shōryū Katsura’s article on the three forms of apoha in this volume.
41. For more on yogic perception and for other references to recent work on Dharmakīrti’s theory, see Dunne 2006.
42. PV III.285 (ed. Sāmkṛtyāyana): “tasmād bhūtam abhūtaṁ vā yad yad evābhībhāvyate / bhāvanāparinīśpatattau tat sūṭākalpadhīphalam.”